Two recent empirical studies of the 2001 recession published in the American Economic Review imply that an old-fashioned Keynesian fiscal stimulus-a cash transfer ("tax rebate") or tax cut to households--can overcome the zero interest-rate bound problem. We provide a quantitative estimate of the cash transfer that would achieve recovery from a severe recession when confronted with the zero bound. We obtain our result by adapting and simulating a macro-econometric model that has been recently econometrically estimated. With the interest rate near zero, a cash transfer equal to 3% of quarterly GDP repeated four times (quarterly) would reduce the unemployment rate nearly a full percentage point.
2000; McCallum 2000; and Krugman 1998).
2 Moreover, these articles do not incorporate the results of the two recent empirical studies of the impact of the tax rebate in the 2001 recession. Finally, most of the recent zero bound papers do not use an econometrically estimated model (an exception is Reifschneider and Williams 2000, but their paper largely omits fiscal stimulus). By contrast, we obtain our quantitative estimates by adapting and simulating a macro-econometric model that has been recently econometrically estimated, updated, and statistically tested using U.S. time-series data. A recent exposition and application of this macro-econometric model is given in this journal by Fair (2005a) .
The Macroeconometric Model
We use the US quarterly macro-econometric model developed by Ray Fair of Yale University, which we modify to address the specific zero bound problem. The Fair model has been recently econometrically estimated, updated, and tested using U.S. times series data (Fair 2004) . Two recent articles have reported studies that use the Fair model to provide estimates of the effectiveness of monetary policy (Fair 2005a ) and the impact of monetary and fiscal policy on the 2001 recession (Fair 2005b ). Fair (1994 Fair ( , 2004 empirically tests for rational expectations with negative results and therefore omits it from his model; he comments that if expectations are not rational, then the Lucas critique is not likely to be important. Fair makes his model accessible to other researchers. We respecify parts of the Fair model, and then estimate and simulate the modified Fair model using the Fair-Parke program (Fair 1996) 2 Feldstein (2002) proposes a new and different kind of fiscal stimulus-a temporary cut in a consumption tax rate-which would provide a price incentive to spend promptly. Though he regards his downloaded from Fair=s website (http://fairmodel.econ. yale.edu). Detailed information on the Fair model is given by Fair (1994 Fair ( , 2003 Fair ( , 2004 proposal as a substitute for cash transfers, we regard it as a complement (Seidman, 2003 "Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, most U.S. taxpayers received a tax rebate between July and September 2001. The week in which the rebate was mailed was based on the second-to-last digit of the taxpayer's Social Security number, a digit that is effectively randomly assigned. Using special questions about the rebates added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we exploit this historically unique experiment to measure the change in consumption expenditures caused by receipt of the rebate…" Each week from July through September a fraction of households received the rebate. The order in which they received it was random because the timing of the mailing of each rebate was based on the second-to-last digit of the recipient's Social Security number. The authors emphasize that this random assignment was critical to their study. Also critical to their study was the insertion of a special module with questions about the timing and amount of their tax rebate in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey. The authors worked with the staff of the BLS to construct the module. The authors were able to estimate how a household's spending was affected by the actual receipt of the rebate, because households received the same rebate check in different weeks that were randomly assigned. The authors report:
"We find that households spent about 20-40 percent of their rebates on non-durable goods during the three-month period in which their rebates were received, and roughly another third of their rebates during the subsequent three month period. The implied effects on aggregate consumption demand are significant. The estimated responses are largest for households with relatively low liquid wealth and low income, consistent with liquidity constraint." as part of a larger tax package.
Low-income households spent a much larger fraction of their rebate-about 75 percent--during the three month period of receipt than middle-income households. Also, households with few liquid assets spent a significantly greater share of their rebates.
Over the two quarters following receipt of the rebate, households spent about two-thirds of their rebate on nondurable consumption goods. Thus, their study implies a magnitude of spending that is roughly twice as great as Shapiro/Slemrod or the Fair model.
To summarize: Based on these two empirical studies, our use of the Fair model probably understates the impact of rebates because the model has a short-run MPC that is roughly the lower estimate of these two studies.
The Recession
The baseline Fair forecast for the unemployment rate for eight quarters (2003.3 through 2005.2) is shown in the U B column of Table 1 . We introduce a negative demand shock beginning in 2003.3 that generates a recession. If monetary policy were adjusted to keep the Treasury threemonth bill rate 4 on its baseline path (projected by Fair=s forecast), then the path the unemployment rate would follow is shown in the U R column. For example, in the eighth quarter of recession the unemployment rate would be 7.9% (versus 5.5% on the Fair baseline path). 5 We will refer 4 The Treasury bill rate RS is the monthly auction average for the quarter.
to the U R column as Αthe recession≅ path of the unemployment rate.
Aggressive Monetary Policy
We assume the Fed conducts an aggressive monetary policy: it expands its open-market purchases enough to reduce immediately the three-month Treasury bill rate to zero and also collapse the term structure, eventually reducing the corporate bond rate and the mortgage rate to near zero. This is more aggressive than the estimated Taylor rule in the Fair model, so to implement the simulation, we suspend the estimated Taylor rule in the Fair model and replace it with the aggressive monetary policy (details of how we respecified the model are given in the Appendix). Under the collapse of the term structure, both the bond rate and the mortgage rate are reduced to about 2.2% in the fourth quarter and 0.9% in the eighth quarter. 6 The U M column of Table 1 shows the path of the unemployment rate under this monetary policy. For example, the eighth quarter unemployment rate would be 6.7% (versus 7.9% without aggressive monetary policy).
Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy: Cash Transfers to Households
five equations: the equations for consumer expenditure for services, nondurables, and durables, as well as the equations for residential housing investment and business capital stock (which thereby reduces non-residential fixed investment).
In this paper the fiscal stimulus is cash transfers to households, but the results would be similar if the fiscal stimulus were income tax cuts to households. While transfers can be implemented by discretionary action by Congress, we will assume in this paper that Congress pre-enacts a transfer rule (automatic transfer rules are discussed in Seidman 2001 , Seidman and Lewis 2002 , and Seidman 2003 that prescribes an automatic triggering of a new cash transfer to households in response to a high unemployment rate--in particular, the rule prescribes a Αtransfer/GDP ratio≅ that is proportional to the Αunemployment gap.≅ Congress would specify the aggregate transfer and also how the aggregate transfer is distributed to individual households (for example, an equal dollar amount per household).
Specifically, the aggregate new anti-recession quarterly real transfer R would be given by
where R/Y -1 is the Αtransfer ratio≅ and [U -1 -(U N +T)] is the Αunemployment gap≅; U -1 is last quarter=s unemployment rate, U N is the NAIRU (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), T is a threshold above the NAIRU, s is the strength parameter, R is the aggregate quarterly real transfer, and Y -1 is the quarterly real GDP of the last quarter. Hence, the transfer rule prescribes a transfer/GDP ratio that is proportional to the unemployment gap. The Congressional Budget Office would provide an estimate of the NAIRU. Based on the advice of technical staff, Congress would pre-enact the values of T and s. In this paper for illustration , we will use T=0.5%, s=2, and NAIRU=5.2% (based on CBO=s recent estimate). Hence, in our simulations, a transfer is triggered whenever the unemployment rate exceeds 5.7%. For example, in the first quarter of the recession in Table 1 the unemployment rate is 6.7%, so applying the formula above, R/Y -1 = 2[6.7% -(5.2%+0.5%)] = 2%. Thus, the aggregate transfer that would be triggered this quarter would equal 2% of last quarter=s GDP--we will say that the prescribed transfer/GDP ratio is 2%. The unemployment gap in this example is 1.0%. With s=2, the transfer ratio would be twice the unemployment gap.
We assume it is administratively feasible to trigger a transfer this quarter based on the unemployment rate (U -1 ) and GDP (Y -1 ) for the preceding quarter. The Bureau of Labor Statistics announces its estimate of last month=s unemployment rate on the first Friday of this month. The
Department of Commerce issues a preliminary estimate for the preceding quarter=s GDP one month after the end of the quarter. To mail the checks out in the second and third month, the Treasury can have the addresses ready to go in advance and can enter the dollar amount per check as soon as the Commerce Department=s GDP estimate is available. 7 The actual experience with the 2001 $600 tax rebateΧ enacted in June, and mailed out in July, August, and September--shows that implementing the transfer policy with a one-quarter lag is feasible. Similar speed of implementation was achieved in the summer of 2003 with an advanced payment of the child tax credit.
We introduce into the Fair model a new endogenous transfer from the federal government to households through the transfer rule. 8 The new endogenous transfer is included in the Fair model as follows. The real transfer is R t (and real GDP in the preceding quarter is Y t-1 ). The total nominal transfer from federal government to households is TRGH t = TRGH bt + (PH t )R t , where TRGH bt is Fair=s nominal exogenous transfer and (PH t )R t is the nominal anti-recession transfer (PH t is a consumer price deflator).
Implementing the transfer rule involves solving the Fair model successively with the Fair-Parke program.
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The U M&F column of Table 1 shows the path of the unemployment rate under the transfer rule combined with a monetary policy that achieves the same interest rate path as would have been achieved with the aggressive monetary policy described above. The transfer rule substantially improves the performance of the economy. It reduces the unemployment rate of the economy by nearly a full percentage point: the unemployment rate in the eighth quarter is 5.9% versus 6.7% with monetary policy only; the improvement in the unemployment rate is shown in the ?U F column (for example, -0.8% in the eighth quarter). Table 2 shows the magnitude of the transfers and the resulting government deficit and debt over the eight quarters. The Αtransfer ratio≅ R/Y is the ratio of the new anti-recession quarterly real transfer to quarterly real GDP. The R/Y column shows the path of the transfer ratio under the transfer rule combined with the monetary policy that achieves the same interest rate path (as would have been achieved with the aggressive monetary policy described above): the quarterly transfer as a percent of that quarter=s GDP begins at 1.9% in the second quarter, 10 peaks at 2.7% in the third quarter, declines to 1.5% in the sixth quarter, and to 0.4% in the eighth quarter; the sum of the percentages in the R/Y column--Αthe cumulative transfer percentage≅Χ is roughly 12% of a quarter=s GDP. This is the fiscal stimulus required to reduce the unemployment rate by nearly a full percentage point (from 6.7% to 5.9%).
The Αdeficit ratio≅ (D/Y) in Table 2 is the ratio of the government deficit to GDP. 
Conclusions
Two recent empirical studies of the 2001 recession published in the American Economic Review imply that an old-fashioned Keynesian fiscal stimulus-a cash transfer ("tax rebate") or tax cut to households--can overcome the zero interest-rate bound problem. We provide a quantitative estimate of the cash transfer that would achieve recovery from a severe recession when confronted with the zero bound. We obtain our result by adapting and simulating a macro-econometric model that has been recently econometrically estimated and has a short-run marginal propensity to consume (MPC) that is roughly the same as Shapiro and Slemrod and roughly half of Johnson, Parker, and Souleles-hence, our use of the Fair model probably understates the impact of rebates in light of these studies. With the interest rate near zero, a cash transfer equal to 3% of quarterly GDP repeated four times (quarterly), or an equal tax cut sustained for four quarters, would reduce the unemployment rate nearly a full percentage point. 
